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Abstract
I argue that normative formal epistemology (NFE) is best understood as modelling,
in the sense that this is the reconstruction of its methodology on which NFE is doing
best. I focus on Bayesianism and show that it has the characteristics of modelling.
But modelling is a scientific enterprise, while NFE is normative. I thus develop an
account of normative models on which they are idealised representations put to nor-
mative purposes. Normative assumptions, such as the transitivity of comparative
credence, are characterised as modelling idealisations motivated normatively. I then
survey the landscape of methodological options: what might formal epistemologists
be up to? I argue the choice is essentially binary: modelling or theorising. If NFE
is theorising it is doing very poorly: generating false claims with no clear method-
ology for separating out what is to be taken seriously. Modelling, by contrast, is
a successful methodology precisely suited to the management of useful falsehoods.
Regarding NFE as modelling is not costless, however. First, our normative infer-
ences are less direct and are muddied by the presence of descriptive idealisations.
Second, our models are purpose-specific and limited in their scope. I close with
suggestions for how to adapt our practice.
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1 Introduction
I will argue that much normative work in formal epistemology is best understood as a kind
of modelling, where by this I mean the widespread and successful strategy of scientific
inquiry.1
What is a model, and what is this method? I shall spend some time on this, but here
is a brief example. In studying the population of fish in my local pond, I observe the fish
feeding, breeding, and dying, for a few generations. I realise that the pond has a finite
capacity for fish, due to their needs for space and competition for food. I observe that the
population this week generally depends positively on the population last week, but that as
the population reaches the capacity of the pond, crowding hampers population growth.
In order to predict the population behaviour, I decide to use the following equation:
Nt+1 = 4Nt(1−Nt), where N is the number of fish in the pond divided by the carrying
capacity, and t is a time index counting weeks.
In so doing, I am modelling the fish population. There are a few notable features of
this model. I have represented some aspects of the fish population mathematically. In
so doing, I ignore many features of the real pond and fish, such as the natural variation
in fish size and reproduction. I treat time as discrete, and count only weeks. I ignore
certain factors which I know influence the population level, such as fishing. I make no
claims that this equation describes fish growth everywhere: the 4 is a parameter that I
choose based on my local observations. Crucially, I go on with my inquiry by studying
this formal apparatus as a proxy for the pond itself. These are characteristic features of
modelling as a method.
Talk about “modelling” as a method of philosophical inquiry is increasingly prevalent
across a range of philosophical sub-fields. Williamson (2006, 186-7) defends modelling as
a tool for developing clear arguments, and as a major source of philosophical progress
(Williamson, 2017, 8). Leitgeb (2013, 273) cites modelling as a method for building
inductive strength in an argument. Godfrey-Smith (2006, 2012) and Paul (2012) have
discussed modelling as a practice in metaphysics. Titelbaum (2012) described his book
as providing a framework for building models in formal epistemology, and has recently
written on the nature of normative models (Titelbaum, b). Colyvan (2013) has written
about idealisations in normative models, and Yap (2014) has characterised epistemic logic
as a descriptive but idealised model.
My focus in this essay will be a group of philosophical approaches falling under the
heading of “Bayesianism” in formal epistemology and decision theory: philosophical work
which talks about agents having and updating probabilistic beliefs. I am interested in the
use of Bayesian tools for normative ends: generating evaluative and prescriptive claims
about how agents ought to be or what they ought to do, in order to be rational. Though
my focus is on Bayesianism, it is intended to stand in for a wider range of philosophical
work which makes use of idealised logico-mathematical representations of agents and
their attitudes for normative ends; including other bits of epistemology (epistemic logic,
belief revision theory, Dempster-Shafer theory, etc.), as well as work that goes under the
1I suspect that little of what I argue for here is deeply attached to mathematics. I begin with formal
philosophy because it is a relatively clear case. But the characteristics which I argue make NFE modelling
can also be found in some non-formal work. For this reason, the precise delineation between formal and
non-formal epistemology is not of major concern to me. Some non-formal normative epistemology could
be construed as modelling, and I think that modelling is a fruitful method for non-formal philosophers. I
will not defend these claims here, but for a discussion of modelling in ethics, not dependent on formalism,
see (Roussos, ms).
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headings of social choice and opinion pooling. For this reason I will refer to my target
as “normative formal epistemology” or NFE, without meaning to imply by my choice of
examples that all such formal work in epistemology is Bayesian, nor that I can neatly
delineate formal from non-formal epistemology.
This is a philosophy of science paper, where the target “science” is (this bit of)
philosophy.2 I analyse how philosophers are working and argue that much of this work
is best understood as modelling. This may sound like I will describe empirical research
into how philosophers in fact work, but that is not my intention. I intend to offer a
rational reconstruction of the method of NFE, in the sense of Reichenbach (1938). Such
a reconstruction has a quasi-descriptive part and a critical part.
I begin by showing that NFE can be described as modelling, by offering a recon-
struction which has characteristic features of scientific modelling. In so doing, I provide
an account of how normative work can be modelling, which is typically descriptive. I
then offer philosophers a dilemma: modelling or bust. I contrast modelling with direct
theorising, and argue that if we do not regard NFE as modelling, then it appears to be
rife with falsehoods—itself a disqualifying characteristic for theory—and without a clear,
justified method of sorting claims that are to be taken seriously from those that are to be
ignored. In it in this sense that normative formal epistemology is “best” understood as
modelling: this reconstruction best justifies its methods. Thus, epistemologists ought to
be modelling. Once we accept this, we can turn to tuning our modelling methods. I argue
that much more needs to be done to study the interaction between our idealisations and
our normative conclusions. I then argue that our immediate goals need revision: while
we may desire universal and perhaps necessary truths, what models give us is something
much more limited.
2 The Target
In the kind of work I have in mind, philosophers typically start with an initial ques-
tion/problem framed in natural language. Some principles of rationality governing the
agents involved are chosen for investigation. These are translated into a formal language
capable of representing agents, propositions, beliefs, and so on (as necessary). Construct-
ing this formal apparatus often requires introducing additional structure, that is not
motivated by the initial question but is internal to the process of representing it math-
ematically. The formal setup is then studied, and conclusions are drawn. Finally, these
formal results are translated into conclusions about partial belief or decision-making.3
This sort of thing is now very common and so I assume quite familiar, but here are
two examples for specificity. First, from Pettigrew (2016, 2):
Let us suppose that Yasho has opinions about only two propositions:
A: Sonya is a political activist and an accountant.
B: Sonya is an accountant.
2If, like Morgenbesser (1967, xvi), you think that “philosophy of science is epistemology with scientific
examples” then you can take this as an epistemology paper with formal epistemology examples.
3Formal epistemologists and decision theorists use many terms to refer to the belief-like attitude they
study: partial belief, degree of belief, credence, comparative confidence, and no doubt others. At times
these are used with subtle differences, but in this essay they should be taken to be synonymous.
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We represent his doxastic state by a function c that takes each proposition
about which he has an opinion and returns a real number that measures his
credence (or degree of belief) in that proposition. By convention, we take
0 to measure minimal credence, and 1 to measure maximal credence. Thus,
we represent Yasho’s doxastic state by a function c : {A,B} → [0, 1] (where
[0, 1] is the set of real numbers at least 0 and at most 1). We call c his
credence function and {A,B} his opinion set. In our example, Yasho has
greater credence in A than in B: thus, c(B) < c(A).
Second, another fairly representative passage from Earman (1992, 35-36) laying out a
mathematical structure along with some interpretation.
[S]ince probability is being interpreted as degree of belief, probabilities will be
assigned to objects which express propositions, namely sentences.[. . . ] Then
a probability function Pr is a map from A to R satisfying at least the following
restrictions:
(A1) Pr(A) ≥ 0 for any A ∈ A
(A2) Pr(A) = 1 if |= A
(A3) Pr(A ∨B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) if |=∼ (A&B)
Here |= A means that A is valid in the sense that A is true in all [interpre-
tations] or all possible worlds. [. . . ] I assume at a minimum that A respects
propositional logic. In this case (A1) to (A3) suffice to prove many of the
familiar principles of probability, including the following:
. . .
(P2) Pr(A) = Pr(B) if A↔ B
. . .
(P4) Pr(A) ≤ Pr(B) if A |= B
Here A |= B means that A semantically implies B in the sense that B is true
in every model or possible world in which A is true.
Note some obvious features of these passages. The agential attitude under study,
degree of belief, is represented by a mathematical object. That object is a probability
function and its mathematical properties are taken to represent features of the attitude.
In Pettigrew’s passage, the mathematical relationship c(B) < c(A) represents Yasho
having greater confidence that Sonya is a political activist and an accountant than that
she is an accountant.
There are two roles played by the mathematics here. The first is description. Petti-
grew is introducing some mathematics which represents some facts about Yasho. Earman
begins at the more general level, introducing a framework for representing degrees of be-
lief. Some features of this general framework match with patterns of facts about agents’
actual degrees of belief. We are able to compare our strength of belief in different propo-
sitions and, when things go well, our degrees of belief are transitive and respect known
logical relations between propositions. But this is not descriptive work, or not primar-
ily descriptive. Bayesian epistemology is a theory of rational partial belief, and so the
mathematics represents properties which agents ought to have. Indeed, the mathematics
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is used to generate normative claims like “if an agent has a certain degree of belief in A,
and A implies B, then the agent ought to have at least as high a degree of belief in B as
in A.”
My target is this kind of mathematical work which represents—in some sense—agents
and their attitudes and which is deployed for normative ends.
One of my motivations is to find a way to understand the seeming falsehoods that this
work involves. Here are two examples. Earman’s (A1) says that there is a probability
value for every sentence in the set A. Thus, the agent has an attitude to every proposition
and, as these are represented by numbers, they are commensurable. We can compare the
agent’s attitudes to any two propositions precisely and quantitatively: we can say how
much more confident they are in one than the other. This quantitative comparability
is critical for many decision theoretic applications of this framework. But, to some, the
completeness and fine-grainedness of this comparability are neither normative nor true.
How should we regard the fact that the mathematics seems to “say” that agents have
complete and continuous credences, when in fact they don’t?
Earman’s (A2), (P2), and (P4), are part of the infamous “logical omniscience” of
Bayesian agents. They say that agents (ought to) assign the maximum degree of belief
in any sentence expressing a logical truth, that the same degrees of belief are assigned
to logically equivalent sentences, and that degree of belief is monotonic over entailment.
Agents who were really like this would have quite unusual beliefs! They would believe fully
every truth of mathematics, believe equally in even opaque and complex but equivalent
sentences, and their degrees of belief would track logical entailments—all of which is,
clearly, far beyond us. Again, what should we make of this? Some argue that logical
omniscience is a norm or ideal, of a sort (e.g., Lemmon and Henderson (1959), see Yap
(2014) for further discussion of how omniscience is regarded in epistemic logic). But
again, others disagree. For this latter camp, there is an important question of whether
and when it matters that the framework has this false implication.
Below, I will argue that regarding NFE as modelling allows us to understand the
nature of these claims, tells us why we don’t need to worry about them, and gives us a
way to do so in a justified and systematic manner.
3 Normative Formal Epistemology as Modelling
In this section and the next I will show that the shoe fits. I will relate some lessons from
the last five or six decades of philosophical study of scientific modelling, and then show
that NFE has the characteristics philosophers have identified for models. This establishes
the possibility and hopefully plausibility of interpreting NFE as modelling. I will then
turn to arguing that we ought to do so.
A preliminary note: “Model” is used to mean many different things. I do not intend
to use the meaning logicians give to the term, which is roughly an assignment of semantic
values to a basic vocabulary, such that a specific set of sentences is rendered true. The
way I use the term “model” is broadly consistent with a philosophy of science tradition
that includes Cartwright (1983, 1989), Morgan and Morrison (1999) and the many others
cited below. If you typically think of models as set-theoretic structures you will need to
take this section as stipulating a new meaning for that term.4
4As Williamson (2017) points out, some models (in roughly my sense) in formal epistemology are
also logic models, so my sense of model is wider than the logical sense. I am thus not denying that logic
models play a role, they simply aren’t my focus.
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We have already seen an example of a scientific model: the logistic growth model of
my fish population, described by the second paragraph of this paper, and making use of
the equation Nt+1 = 4Nt(1−Nt). Note the verbs I used there: the model is “described” by
those sentences, and “uses” that equation. The model itself is a kind of abstract system
which those elements specify (Mäki, 2009, 33). The model represents a target system in
the world, in this case my fish pond. Some models have types of systems as their target,
rather than particular systems—like Bohr’s model of the hydrogen atom. Others appear
to have no target, such as theoretical models for ether or phlogiston, substances which
do not exist.
Here we have two important elements of modelling. First, modelling is characterised
by indirect inquiry (Giere, 2004; Weisberg, 2007b; Godfrey-Smith, 2007). Instead of
studying a natural system, modellers describe and investigate a “model system” which
is the primary target of their investigation. Second, representation plays a crucial role in
modelling: the model system is taken to (partially) represent the target natural system
(Frigg and Hartmann, 2018; Frigg and Nguyen, 2020). Modellers infer facts or generate
hypotheses about the target system based on their investigation of the model system.
(In cases where the model is target-less, they are still thought to be representational in
a sense to be discussed later.)
Indirect inquiry using representations is a neat description of much NFE. Consider
Pettigrew’s argument for Probabilism. “Probabilism is a coherence requirement. It says
how a credence in a proposition should relate to credences in other, logically related
propositions. It requires that an agent’s credences obey the axioms of the probability
calculus” (Pettigrew, 2016, 8). In his usage, “credence” refers both to the agent’s attitude
and to the function c which Pettigrew introduces to represent that attitude. I read the
second sentence just quoted as referring to the attitudes: Probabilism is a norm which
tells us how our degrees of belief should be related. It requires that the mathematical
function which represents them obey the probability calculus—or, more carefully, that
those attitudes be so representable. The bulk of Pettigrew’s book is about these credence
functions. He introduces various norms for beliefs, translates them into his mathematical
framework, and then proves various results which build up to Probabilism. Credence
functions are investigated as a proxy for studying credences, which they represent. In
section 4 I discuss how the normativity of this work interacts with its use of representation.
The next characteristic feature of scientific modelling is its central use of idealisa-
tion. Rather than representing their targets with perfect accuracy, models present an
abstracted and distorted picture of the target system (Weisberg, 2007a; Frigg and Hart-
mann, 2018). Many real-world systems cannot be investigated directly, due to incomplete
theories, partial understanding, or severe computational complexity. Scientists work to
identify the features of the system most salient to their investigation (Weisberg, 2013, 4).
To make progress, they simplify the system under investigation, by changing or leaving
out aspects of the real system—these changes are called “idealisations”. The frictionless
plane is a classic example: no real surface is frictionless, but it is fruitful to take a surface
to be frictionless when investigating inertial motion of objects on an inclined plane.
The mathematical structures in NFE have many differences from the attitudes they
represent. I have already mentioned the precise numerical comparability and complete-
ness of partial belief, and logical omniscience. Logic-based models of belief often use sets
of propositions which are closed under entailment, though the attitude represented, such
as real belief or knowledge, is typically not so closed. Put in our new language: there are
differences between the properties of the target of the model—the real agent and their
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beliefs—and the representation in the model. I propose that these are all idealisations,
and I will discuss the role normativity plays in justifying some of them in section 4.4.
There are different kinds of idealisations (Frigg and Hartmann, 2018): Galilean ideali-
sations introduce deliberate distortions to some properties of the system under investiga-
tion. For example, the friction of the plane is deliberately changed in the representation.
Aristotelian idealisations leave out features of the system that are not relevant to the
problem being studied, to allow us to focus on or isolate a limited set of properties. For
example, a population growth model considers only the rate of reproduction and leaves
out all other properties.5
I suggest that the continuity of credence is a Galilean idealisation, as are the com-
pleteness and commensurability the Bayesian framework introduces. Thought of as a
representation of an agent, Bayesian decision theory has many Aristotelian idealisations:
the orthodox theory focuses on only two attitudes—belief and desire—leaving out other
aspects of the agent’s psychology.
Idealisations introduce falsehoods into the set of descriptions of the target system that
the model generates. Some of these false descriptions are unexpected properties which
emerge during the study of the model. These “artefacts” should not be used to generate
predictions or explanations of the real system. Modelling requires skilful interpretation—
modellers know that some descriptions generated by the model are not to be imputed to
the target system, while others are. As a result, models require what Frigg and Nguyen
(2016) call a “key”. By analogy with a map’s key, this is a legend that tells the user
how to interpret what they’re seeing in the model. It specifies whether and how results
from the model should be taken to relate to the world. In section 6 I will argue that
philosophical models, too, come with (often implicit) keys.
These falsehoods are not accidental, nor can they always be removed. They are often
critical to generating the model’s results, including true explanations of phenomena (Frigg
and Nguyen, 2021). Models are crucial to the development of scientific understanding
of the modelled system, despite their falsehoods (de Regt, 2017). This should temper
some worries that describing NFE as modelling means giving up on true explanation or
understanding as epistemic goals.
Idealisations, representational choices, and trade-offs in the modelling process are jus-
tified relative to the purpose of the inquiry. This purpose and the idealisations together
fix a restricted domain of applicability for scientific models’ results (Teller, 2001; Weis-
berg, 2007b). “Purpose” consists of what you’re modelling (e.g., ants rather than bears)
and what you’re trying to do (e.g., study group coordination). This establishes the basic
domain of the model (it is a model of ant coordination).
There are two important consequences of this. First, model-based sciences often
contain multiple, disagreeing models of the same phenomena. Teller illustrates this with
an example of two models of water. One is interested in the flow of water and wave
propagation, and it models the liquid as a continuous incompressible medium. The other
is interested in explaining diffusion, say of a drop of ink in water. It models water as a
collection of discrete particles in thermal motion. Each is similar to water in the respects
that are relevant to its purpose, but the two models look very different (Teller, 2001,
401). Neither should be thought to provide a definitive characterisation of water, and our
understanding of water is enhanced by having both available. Second, philosophers have
argued that the success condition for scientific models is not truth per se, but adequacy
for purpose (notably Parker, 2009). This does not remove truth from the picture: it
5Some authors call Aristotelian idealisations “abstractions,” though usage is by no means uniform.
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remains the ultimate goal of inquiry. But models have different immediate aims, against
which they are evaluated. Truth is approached more indirectly, through a series of model-
based inquiries which delivery important insights about limited domains, or particular
questions.
The goals of modelling will have to wait until section 6, but I will comment briefly
on multiple models in NFE. Let us widen our focus out from Bayesianism to some other
approaches I mentioned in the introduction: epistemic logic, belief revision theory, and
Dempster-Shafer theory. There is, I think, a perfectly natural sense in which these ap-
proaches don’t compete but rather are suited to different purposes. Bayesian methods
don’t foreground knowledge, and so epistemologists working on knowledge find tools more
suited to their ends in epistemic logic. Because of the lottery and preface paradoxes, it is
difficult to account simultaneously for dichotomous and graded belief. So, for questions
framed naturally in terms of full belief, a model which neglects degrees of belief is often
suitable. Epistemologists interested in how evidence supports beliefs might want to for-
mally represent the difference between the evidential situation of an agent with a known
fair coin, and that of an agent with a new coin of unknown bias. Dempster-Shafer belief
functions are intended to measure support, and using them one can express explicitly the
evidential differences between the risky and ambiguous coin (Genin and Huber, 2021).6
4 Normativity and Modelling
I hope that you now see enough of a rough fit between normative formal epistemology and
modelling to be worth investigating. I will now show in detail how we can fit normativity
into an account of modelling, while retaining the characteristics described above. This
serves two purposes: it continues my reconstruction of NFE as modelling, and motivates
for drawing on the philosophy of science literature in improving our practice in epistemol-
ogy and decision theory. Along the way, I characterise what it means for something to
be a normative model. My account differs from an existing account of normative models,
due to Titelbaum (b), and so I discuss the differences between our views below.
Here is a summary of the various pieces of the account. In science, models often rep-
resent a target system which they are “models of”. In NFE, these are models of agents,
like you and me, and our attitudes like partial belief. In science, models are built to “fit”
some data. In NFE, this data is a mixture of descriptive facts about agents’ attitudes
and what we might call “normative data” (following Titelbaum, b). In science, models
employ idealisations—deliberate distortions or omissions of properties of the target sys-
tem. In NFE, we employ both “descriptive idealisations” and “normative idealisations”.
In science, models are used to predict, explain, and understand the target system. So too
in NFE, though in place of prediction we have something like the generation of normative
claims, which are tested against the “data”—our considered judgements.
4.1 Target and Representation
It is natural to say that models in NFE are representations of beliefs, desires, and agents.
The agents and attitudes are not represented in a descriptively accurate fashion, because
this work is normative. Instead these representations of agents and their attitudes are
6You needn’t agree that Bayesianism cannot do all of these things—arguments about the scope of
a model are common and important. But I hope you do accept that these purposes often motivate
particular choices of formal framework. I return to competition between models in section 6.
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represented as being normatively ideal. In representing real agents as being a certain way,
normative models eschew the goal of descriptive accuracy. In this, they are no different
from other representations: stylised imagery, caricatures, or heavily touched-up glamour
photography. The theory of scientific modelling has the resources to explain this, drawing
on the notion of representation-as developed by Goodman (1976) and Elgin (1983, 2010).
The idea is to separate out two parts of our ordinary notion of representation. Consider
the example of a famous caricature of Churchill as a bulldog standing on Britain. This is a
representation of Churchill, but in a sense it is also a representation of a bulldog (after all,
it is a picture of a bulldog with a vaguely Churchillian face). We separate out these two
notions by calling the first kind, involving denotation of a target, representation-of; and
the second, involving the way in which the target is shown (also known as its secondary
subject), representation-as. The formula is: an object X (the drawing) represents a target
Y (Churchill) as something, Z (a bulldog).
The Z variable identifies the secondary subject; the kind of representation it is, or
what it portrays. I will refer to these genres of representation as Z-representations (e.g.,
bulldog-representations). As our formula says, Z-representations are objects (like draw-
ings), and what fixes the genre Z is an interpretation. We can think of an interpretation
as a function, mapping properties of the object to properties of Z. We associate properties
of the caricature (particular lines, shading etc.) with properties of a bulldog (a certain
stoutness, folded skin, etc.). Interpretations allow us to talk about Z-representations as
“having” Z-properties that, strictly speaking, they do not. (The drawing does not have
four legs, it is a drawing.) With something like a caricature, certain properties are high-
lighted as particularly relevant and the intention is that we impute those properties to
the target. Bulldogs are pugnacious, and the caricature highlights this with the stance of
the Churchill-dog in the drawing, with the intention that we regard Churchill as pugna-
cious. This is the final part of representation-as: when there is a target, we can impute
highlighted Z-properties to the target.
A number of popular accounts of scientific models agree that they utilise representation-
as (Hughes, 1997; Elgin, 2009; Frigg and Nguyen, 2016). We can deploy this same concep-
tual infrastructure to account for the normative aspects of NFE. Our normative models
in NFE are representations of real agents and their beliefs, and they are also agent-
representations. These agent-representations are constructed in part to resemble the
targets—they have the same kinds of attitudes as real agents, as well as various other
features. But they are also idealised in various ways, so that the agents portrayed are
dissimilar to real agents. Some of these differences are descriptive idealisations (I will
suggest which below). Unlike scientific models, however, some of these differences are
normative. The model’s results are used to generate claims about the target, but here
the claims are normative rather than being descriptive. The real agents are represented
as normatively ideal agents.7
My account explains why philosophers occasionally say that these are “models of
ideal agents”—it is the same usage as calling the Churchill caricature a picture of a
dog. Much of our work in formal philosophy involves the manipulation of the model
objects (the mathematical structures), in the form of deriving results and interpreting
them in terms of the properties of agents. So, far from being a barrier to understanding
normative philosophy as modelling, representation is key to understanding how NFE
7Note the double-duty that the word “idealised” is doing here. Models are also idealised representa-
tions, without the word “ideal” implying anything normative. In the philosophical case, “ideal agents”
are normative ideals but we see now that they may also be also descriptively idealised.
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generates normative claims that are relevant to real agents.
4.2 Data
Scientific models are constructed using data, typically measurements of the target system
such as the records of my observations of the fish pond. The model is constructed to “fit”
this data, which is to say that the claims generated by the model about the target should
agree, closely but not completely, with the data. (This wiggle room is inserted because
data are typically noisy.)
What are the data used to construct a normative model? Titelbaum takes his answer
to this to offer the defining feature of normative modelling in philosophy: “I distinguish
descriptive from normative models in terms of the data they attempt to fit. Descriptive
models attempt to fit descriptive facts about, say, some natural or social phenomenon.
Normative models attempt to fit normative facts. Examples of normative facts include
prescriptions (you shouldn’t act against your own best interests) and evaluations (it’s
irrational to believe a contradiction), but also general facts involving normative concepts
(correct inference requires truth-preservation).” (Titelbaum, b, 2-3).
While I agree with the broad thrust of this, I want to add some additional detail.
The “facts” in Titelbaum’s parenthetical remarks are certainly what we are attempting
to capture, but they are not the inputs to the process of modelling, in the same way that
facts about the way the world is are not what is used in the construction of scientific
models (Bogen and Woodward, 1988). Rather we fit scientific models to data, which
are the result of measurement, or calculation, or what have you. I favour an account on
which our philosophical data are judgements—either our considered judgements made
directly about normative matters (also called intuitions) or perhaps judgements made
on the basis of rigorous argumentation or previous modelling exercises. The process of
“considered” judgement is analogous to the preparation and cleaning of empirical data—
we are attempting to reduce noise, so that these data give us a clearer picture about the
facts. Individual data might be rejected as outliers. All this is analogous to science, but
not captured in Titelbaum’s fact-based view (though Titelbaum does acknowledge these
sources of data.)
Two further differences between Titelbaum’s view and my own are relevant. The
first is that I insist that models in NFE also rely on descriptive data—capturing trivial
features of the agent, such as that they have beliefs, and more relevant information such
as the content of those beliefs. The second difference concerns what makes something
a normative model. Titelbaum says it is the fact that the model fits normative data. I
disagree: any model put to a normative purpose is a normative model.
4.3 Normativity as Purpose
I will now defend this claim that a normative model is any model that is put to norma-
tive purposes—evaluation, action-guidance, exploration of putative norms, and perhaps
others.
The use a model is put to depends on the purposes of the modeller, so whether
a model is normative depends on the modeller. Normative models are thus not of a
fundamentally different kind to scientific models, in fact, one can be redeployed as they
other. I am predisposed to an account that unifies normative and scientific modelling in
this way, for part of the purpose of describing NFE as modelling is to utilise the lessons
of philosophy of science to improve our philosophical methods. But I also think that,
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given the relations between normative and descriptive models that I lay out below, it
would be strange and unparsimonious to insist that normative and descriptive models
were different enough that they require distinct accounts and distinct methodologies.
To begin, let us note that normativity is not so foreign to science. Physiological
models in medicine can be thought of as normative, representing how the body should
be, with actual deviations representing illness. Ecological models might represent an
undisturbed ecosystem and thereby act as an evaluative standard for assessing the im-
pact of alien species. Architectural models describe how buildings ought to be built.
Nonetheless, current work in the philosophy of scientific models does not focus on these
normative aspects, preferring representation as a topic of philosophical discussion. So,
addressing normative models is of value both to core philosophy of science and to our
present metaphilosophical project.
The main reason to regard the normativity of normative models as coming from the
purposes of the user is that models can be easily redeployed as normative or descriptive.
This happens in engineering, when an architectural model which began as a representation
of a to-be-built building becomes a normative model for the construction team: telling
them how to build, and providing a standard against which they are evaluated. When
this happens, there is no change in the data the model fits, nor is there a change in the
representational target of the model (there isn’t one). So the model’s normativity doesn’t
come from fitting any normative data, but rather from the user.
We can see this happening in NFE by looking at the decision theory-economics bor-
derland. Following Buchak (2013) we can distinguish four projects of decision theory:
construed normatively, decision theory can be used to evaluate or guide actions; construed
explanatorily, it can be used to describe or interpret actions.8 The normative-evaluative
use of decision theory involves analysing a decision situation facing an agent, and deter-
mining which actions are rational. The normative-action-guiding use involves deploying
this process expressly in order to determine which act to undertake. The descriptive-
explanatory use and the interpretive-explanatory uses are interested in real, rather than
ideal, agents but they differ in their goals. Descriptive theorists are interested in describ-
ing observed patterns of behaviour—this is the empirical project of rational choice theory
within economics. Interpretive theorists take real agents to be aiming at prescriptions of
rationality but failing for various reasons. This theorist seeks to interpret the actions of
the agent, as much as possible, as abiding by the rational theory of decision.
The important point is that the very same logico-mathematical apparatus is often
deployed in each of these projects (perhaps with different degrees of success). There
need be no difference in the mathematical description of a model used in a normative-
evaluative mode by philosophers to generate norms of rationality, and in a descriptive-
explanatory mode by economists to predict choice behaviour. Economists often say they
are using Savage’s model, which was motivated normatively. But the economist’s project
is not normative: they are interested in predicting, explaining, understanding. One might
insist, with Titelbaum, that these are normative models because they fit normative data.
But I think it more natural to say that they are descriptive models which include some
normative data. This inclusion might be justified by regarding a normative property—
such as transitivity of preference—as approximately true of real agents who acknowledge
the norm.
This movement can happen in either direction: a model can begin life as normative,
and later be taken up for descriptive purposes, or vice versa. One easy way to go from
8I have relabelled these projects for convenience, taking inspiration from Thoma (2019).
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descriptive to normative is to fix a physical system as a reference point for generating
norms, and thereby turn a descriptive model of that system—say, Buddha—into a nor-
mative model—generating claims of the form “do as Buddha did”.9
Whatever the origin of the model, what makes it a normative model is that the
modeller intends it to be taken as normative.
4.4 Justifying Idealisations Normatively
As I mentioned above, we expect models to fit the relevant data. But “fitting” is a
match between outputs and data. How to philosophers get their models to fit some
data? One common strategy is to use normative data—judgements about rationality—in
their construction. Philosophers in NFE build these judgements into their models in
the form of normative properties, like the transitivity of preference and partial belief. I
propose that we regard these normative assumptions as a species of idealisation, justified
normatively.
They are idealisations in that they distort or leave out properties of the real system,
paralleling Galilean or Aristotelian idealisations in science. The idealisations of science,
which we can call “descriptive idealisations” to distinguish them, are justified in a variety
of ways each related to the purpose of the inquiry. Musgrave (1981) gives a helpful
taxonomy of justification. In one common case, a modeller takes an idealisation to have
negligible effects: for the purposes of the current investigation it will make negligible
difference to distort/exclude this property. For example, we might consider falling objects
and idealise by assuming there is no air resistance because we believe it to be of negligible
importance. Alternatively, the modeller might know that the property is not negligible
in all cases but want to model only those cases where it is so. Musgrave calls this a
domain idealisation: it justifies itself “automatically” by restricting the class of cases the
model applies to. Finally, the modeller might think that there are no cases where the
property is negligible but distort/exclude it anyway because its presence in the model
makes things too complex to handle. Musgrave calls this a heuristic idealisation, and
presents it as part of a process of inquiry: we simplify the model by setting air resistance
to zero now, with the hope that once we have established the model we can factor air
resistance in later. Note that negligibility, domain-restriction and heuristic necessity are
species of justification—the same idealisation can be justified in each way, depending
on the modeller and the circumstances. Many models contain idealisations justified in
different ways.
I suggest that we view presumed normativity as a fourth species of justification. A
modeller introduces a distortion, relative to the properties of the real system, because
they take it that the system ought to be this way. (Or alternatively they wish to explore
the consequences of regarding it as a norm.) Investigating that norm is part of their
purpose in building the model.10 Normativity is a species of justification because the
same assumption (e.g., transitivity of preference) can be introduced as a norm (e.g., by
a philosophical decision theorist) or as a descriptive idealisation (e.g., by an economist)
justified perhaps by arguing that deviations are negligible.
9For an example of work doing exactly this—generating norms from a real person—albeit not in a
modelling context, see Olberding (2017). ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
10Remember that it is the purpose of the modeller which makes the model as a whole a normative
model. I am speaking here about particular assumptions or constraints in the model which are included
because the modeller takes them to represent norms. A model need not have any of these to count as a
normal model—as described with my example of Buddha above.
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Consider Earman’s model, and the property of monotonicity (P4): degree of belief
does not decrease across entailments. An economist might motivate this idealisation by
any of Musgrave’s three kinds of justification. The philosopher, by contrast, has a fourth
option: degree of belief ought not decrease across entailments.11 When philosophers and
economists use “the same model,” for normative and descriptive ends respectively, what
they are doing is construing these conditions in different ways.12 There are at least two
varieties of this normative justification. Sometimes assumptions are included because
the modeller takes them to be norms (they are supported by reliable data, or are firm
considered judgements). But at other times, these assumptions are the object of study.
The aim is to study how various putative norms hang together, or what a particular
norm’s consequences are.
I think the models in NFE typically employ both normative idealisations and descrip-
tive idealisations. That is because I don’t think that all of the distortions in these models
are norms: completeness and continuity of partial belief, or completeness of preference,
to name a few. Economic and philosophical models in decision theory rely on many of
the same assumptions and there is no need, as I see it, for the philosopher to insist that
all of these assumptions are norms. Modelling is a methodology which makes regular use
of precisely this sort of descriptive idealisation.
Our normative models may thus contain artefacts, expected side-effects of their use of
idealisations. This is one way to understand logical omniscience: a side-effect of certain
desirable aspects of this model of partial belief. For example, one might think it is a norm
that degree of belief should not decrease over known entailments. But in the standard
Bayesian model, the entailment structure is built into the way we represent propositions
and so the logic is “objective”—it doesn’t depend on the agent’s attitudes. Shifting away
from using an objective logic is a daunting task—models of bounded rationality are often
complex (e.g., Garber, 1984). Instead, a philosopher might use a model in which the
agents know all entailments—a descriptive idealisation which, together with the norm,
renders them logically omniscient in the sense here discussed. They do this for reasons
of simplicity, and so to them this property is not normative and this is marked in the
model’s key. (Such a model can’t separate out the entailments covered by the actual
norm about known entailments from those not so covered, and so it not suitable for in-
vestigations that are too close to this norm, such as studies of deductive inference.) This
behaviour amongst philosophers—of simultaneously disavowing logical omniscience but
continuing to use Bayesian tools—is explained by reconstructing their method as mod-
elling. This reconstruction allows us to explain the connection of this kind of work with
that of philosophers interested in bounded rationality. The latter group build less ide-
alised models, seeking to remove descriptive idealisations. This increases the complexity
of the models, but simplifies their use. The less descriptively idealised the model, the
closer we can get to simply “taking its results seriously”, for all those results.
11Pettigrew calls this norm “No Drop” (Pettigrew, 2016, 2).
12However, some economists currently describe their ends asdescriptive though they justify their ide-
alisations normatively. Their models rely on assumptions like the transitivity of preference, which the
economists justify by stating that it is a norm for preference. On my account, justifying the idealisation
normatively is in tension with using the model for descriptive ends, and represents a conceptual confusion
on the economist’s part. It would be better to say that the idealisation is approximately true, which in
turn might be explained by the fact that transitivity is a norm of preference.
13
5 Modelling or Bust
Until this point, I have only tried to show that one can regard NFE as modelling. I’ve
focussed on Bayesianism, but the features that I have drawn upon in this characterisation
are plainly present in other bits of normative formal epistemology. So why should one
use this characterisation? My argument is this: modelling is the rational reconstruction
of normative formal epistemology’s method on which that method is best justified. NFE
does better against its goals if it is modelling. In short, metaphilosophers are faced with
a dilemma when characterising the method of NFE: modelling or bust.
I said in the introduction that this is a rational reconstruction and so I will briefly
say what I think that is and why such a thing is relevant. The method of rational
reconstruction involves presenting some scientific practice, or pattern of reasoning, in a
manner which is best suited for justification. It is partly descriptive, in that it is meant
to “fit with” the actual practices and conclusions. But it is not an exercise in psychology
or sociology. The reconstruction is “rational” in that it contains only the epistemically
relevant aspects of the practice (Laudan, 2004, 15). It relies on a kind of principle of
charity—the goal is to achieve a reconstruction of the practice on which it does best.
For Reichenbach, the aim is that “the rational reconstruction expresses what we mean,
properly speaking” (Reichenbach, 1938, 6). Such Reichenbachian reconstructions serve a
critical purpose: the aim is to prepare the method under study, presenting it in its best
light, before making philosophical recommendations.
I characterise my work as rational reconstruction for two reasons. First, it makes it
clear that it is no objection to my project that philosophers don’t think that they’re mod-
elling, or that they don’t consciously employ the concepts and tools I describe. Secondly,
I agree with French that when we provide philosophical accounts of scientific theories,
models, theorising and modelling we are almost always engaged in a kind of reconstruc-
tion (French, 2020, 5). So if we are to discuss what we’re doing, methodologically, rational
reconstructions are one useful way of conducting that discussion.
5.1 The Landscape of Methodological Possibilities
I claimed that formal epistemologists face a dilemma: modelling or bust. But surely there
are many things we could be doing in NFE? In this subsection, I will discuss various ways
of characterising the methodology of NFE and show why I view the choice as dichotomous.
First, a comment on the scope of my analysis. Not all of science is modelling, and
I don’t think all of philosophy is either. Godfrey-Smith (2007) distinguishes the model-
based “strategy” of science from an alternative, more direct, method of theorising in
biology. Godfrey-Smith’s example of direct theorising employs no simplified representa-
tions; instead, it examines actual organisms, in their actual circumstances. This work is
close to the data, and involves studying real rather than fictional systems. It is synoptic,
making progress by systematising knowledge.
So, even if naturalistic philosophy recommends using scientific methods, these needn’t
be modelling. This direct method, however, is not a good description of NFE. We don’t
work from close attention to real agents in real situations, and not merely because we
have normative aims. Consider Vices of the Mind by Quassim Cassam (2019). It is
epistemology done “from the ground up”—the theory of epistemic vices is built from a
close examination of real cases but the theory is put to normative ends. It is manifestly
unlike the formal epistemology discussed here. There is no conflict between the dichotomy
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I am working towards for NFE, and the existence of successful non-modelling work outside
of NFE.13
Modelling is a method rather than a goal. It therefore doesn’t conflict with the tra-
ditional philosophical project of conceptual analysis, nor with ameliorative analysis, or
Carnapian explication. As noted above, models are used to isolate mechanisms or con-
cepts for particular study (Wimsatt, 2007, 15). Models can support any of these projects
by providing a setting in which a philosopher demonstrates the value of a particular ex-
plication, or a way of isolating the concept being analysed. It is true that models are
limited in scope, and so their use might complicate conceptual analysis which seeks to
offer a universal analysis. But this is analogous to using models in physics, where the
goal is to derive universal laws of nature. All that it requires is care.
Modelling can also support seeking reflective equilibrium. Reflective equilibrium
names both a goal and its associated method. Traditionally, reflective equilibrium is
attained by testing theoretical principles against our judgements about cases. If there is
a conflict between our judgement and the verdict of the principles, we must choose how to
make the two consistent. One option is to change the theory, another is to revise or reject
a judgement. The aim is to iterate this procedure until we arrive at reflective equilibrium;
a point at which our judgements and theory are consistent and remain so in the face of
new cases. There is no conflict between this procedure and using a model to generate
those verdicts. Care will be needed to ensure those verdicts aren’t the result of artefacts,
or overly sensitive to arbitrary modelling choices. Models can be a way for philosophers
to test the conclusions of various principles without resolving all theoretical questions:
by building a model which captures a limited subset of principles in a restricted domain,
models can provide a testing ground for particular aspects of the theory.
5.2 The Trouble with Theory
Perhaps the most natural alternative is that the formal structures used by philosophers
are intended as theories, rather than models. Though not so common in epistemology,
the term “theory” is nearly ubiquitous in ethics and political philosophy, where theo-
ries are often explicitly described as being universal and general, consistent, complete,
axiomatisable, and decidable (by defenders and detractors of theory—see Roussos (ms)
). The rough notion of theory used there is that of a system of claims, centred one or
more laws: universal, exceptionless generalisations. On philosophy of science’s “syntac-
tic view”, theories are precisely such sets of sentences, which are consistent and closed
under entailment. This seems to fit the ideals of philosophy: do we not seek universal,
necessarily true, laws systemised in such theories? It also fits with practice: revealing in-
consistencies and false entailments is a core part of the traditional philosophical practice
of putting forward a conjecture only to have it refuted by a colleague’s counter-example.
(For the sake of precision: from here on I use “theory” in this way and “theorising” to
refer to the practice of theory-building.)
Applied to NFE, this generates a rational reconstruction quite different from mine.
If we are theorising, then the formalism of NFE is merely a language used to present
descriptions and claims which are meant to apply universally (Titelbaum (b) calls this
the “abbreviated description” view of formal philosophy). Work in NFE is intended to
13Similarly, if there is a literature I am not aware of, in which formal epistemology for normative ends
is done “ground up” from detailed observations of real agents, then it is simply not part of my target
here.
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be of universal scope, and its “laws” should be read literally and assessed for truth.
Offered this alternative, many epistemologists might agree with Rosanna Keefe (2000),
who discusses modelling disparagingly in her book on vagueness. Rather than presenting
an idealised, partial representation she aims at a true description of the phenomenon
of vague language. Accordingly, she says, her methodology is not that of the modeller
and she is explicit that every implication of her work is to be taken literally. As Keefe
notes, it is not open to her to tell us to disregard certain parts of her mathematical
framework as artefacts, or to isolate her account of vagueness from other accounts of
linguistic functioning. Not for her the “Get Out of Jail Free” card of modelling. The
success conditions for her work are straightforward: truth; her work is open to refutation
by counterexample, by design (Keefe, 2000, Ch. 2).
But adopting a theory view of NFE would put enormous pressure on the many ideali-
sations it employs. The many criticisms of Bayesianism threaten to undermine the whole
project, if we view it as a theory in the business of generating all and only truths. To
illustrate these problems, I will walk through the following decision tree. First we de-
cide: modelling or theorising. Now consider all the assumptions I labelled “idealisations”
above. What are these: norms, or not norms? An answer must be provided for each.
If any are not norms then the theorising view is, I think, doomed. If all are norms, the
project is beset by counterexamples, in the form of considered judgements that agents
who violate these properties violate no norm. Thus, working back up the tree, the choice
is: modelling or bust.
So, let start with the first node, and suppose that we are theorising. Bayesianism
describes agents as logically omniscient, with complete and precisely commensurable
partial beliefs. Bayesian agents therefore have priors for every proposition—a feature
which is a necessity when we introduce the Bayesian theory of learning by conditioning.
For any possibility, they have a prior attitude to it encoding exactly how surprised they
are that it came about. Bayesian agents have no computational limitations, no limit to
the number of beliefs they hold. These are all false descriptions of real agents. But on the
theorising view, each must be taken seriously, which means each must be interpreted as
a normative statement about the real agents that Bayesianism is intended to be relevant
to. There is perhaps some wiggle room in the interpretation—one might insist that
conditional priors represent evidential standards rather than beliefs (Meacham, 2016;
Titelbaum, a)—but once the interpretation is fixed, every consequence must be examined.
These criticisms are well known (for classic discussions, see Glymour (1980) and Ear-
man (1992)), but let us review some issues with describing these all as norms, regarding
logical omniscience. What prevents us from meeting the demands of Earman’s (A2), (P2),
and (P4) is our cognitive limitations. We find it difficult to determine whether sentences
express tautologies, or whether two sentences express the same proposition. Some of
these tasks are very difficult indeed—capturing the attention of the most talented math-
ematicians or requiring thousands of hours of computational time on algorithms built by
our best computer scientists. These limitations are not usually thought of as subject to
the norms of rationality—it strikes us as plainly wrong to say that mathematicians were
simply irrational for not knowing whether Fermat’s Last Theorem was true. Rationality
is in the business of telling us how our beliefs should fit together, or change over time, or
how we should act given our beliefs. It isn’t in the business of telling us that we ought
to have vastly different capacities, nor that we ought to have specific beliefs—such as full
credence in logical truths.
Every problem for Bayesianism must be examined in this way. Any non-normative
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and false elements are intolerable on the theory view. Now one might be tempted to
say that Bayesianism is a work in progress, that a future Bayesianism will contain only
normative or true elements. But this would be to give up on a lot: Bayesianism would be
relegated to the status of a promising research programme, rather than being one of our
dominant theories of rationality. It would be unclear why anyone should take seriously
the current results, enmeshed as they are in logical omniscience, completeness, continuity,
full awareness, and so on.
In short, if Bayesianism is a theory, it is a bad one.
Two objections are worth considering here. I have been treating Bayesianism as a
theory of very wide scope, as a “guide to life.” But could it not be more local, or restricted
in some way? Perhaps the “global” Bayesianism is doomed, but more local theories can
succeed. This is one of a number of “escape strategies” which point away from theorising
and towards modelling. For example, one might say that Bayesianism is only meant to be
applied to situations in which agents do have complete and commensurable beliefs. This
is a domain restriction, and characterises completeness and commensurability as domain
idealisations. This is how the decision theorist Itzhak Gilboa (2009, 51-2) justifies the
completeness of preference. The theorist can proceed in this way for every problem
with Bayesianism, but the result is a “theory” about agents who look nothing like us,
and which is applicable only in unusual situations. This is not much like the picture of
universal and exceptionless generalisation we started out with.
Or perhaps, as a reviewer suggested, theorists are merely employing some division
of labour. I take it that the idea is to divvy up the task of relaxing these idealisations.
Theorists don’t endorse logical omniscience, it merely isn’t what they’re working on. This
seems, to me, straightforwardly a modelling strategy. Idealisations are not “endorsed” in
science either and, as Musgrave noted, scientists often adopt idealisations only heuristi-
cally. But our results are not easily “detachable” from our idealisations, the justifications
for employing them, and the restrictions they impose. Theorising-plus-division of labour
does not seem to provide any method for managing these useful falsehoods or their effects.
We cannot take literally all the results of the theorist who ignores logical omniscience. So
how should we treat them? The answer, surely, is that given in this paper: the answer
of the modeller. (Managing idealisations will be discussed further in section 6.)
The choice facing epistemologists is this. You can insist that you are theorising, that
your results are intended to be read literally, and that the standard for their evaluation
is truth. In this case, either every assumption you employ is normative or most efforts
in NFE contain straightforward falsehoods and offer no method for sifting the true from
the false. Alternatively, you can say that you are modelling.
6 Costs and Consequences
Accepting that NFE is modelling is not without costs. In this section, I examine some of
what we will have to give up and what we will have to change, once we accept that we
are modelling.
6.1 Securing Normative Inferences
I will start with the question raised at the end of the previous section. How can we know
that the normative inferences of NFE are “secure” in the face of their dependence on
non-normative idealisations?
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The problem concerning us here is that some of our normative conclusions depend
necessarily on these assumptions. Supposing that completeness is neither a normative
standard nor an approximately true description of partial belief, what does that mean for
Probabilism? More generally, do idealisations pose a threat to our normative inferences?
Important strategies for determining the impact of idealisation on scientific models go
under the headings “sensitivity analysis” and “robustness analysis”. The former typically
refers to varying some numerical parameters in a model and studying the changes in the
results, while the latter typically refers to comparing the results of differently idealised
models. One particular worry for idealising assumptions is the possibility of “knife edge”
results—highly unstable results generated by the nature of the idealisation assumptions
(e.g., when they introduce a symmetry). Here, small variations lead to very large changes
of output, undermining the value of the model as a tool for studying a real system, which
is non-ideal. I will examine how we might deploy these strategies in philosophy.
The first strategy for securing our normative conclusions is de-idealisation. Suppose
we are interested in some conclusion from a highly descriptively idealised model. We
construct a new model with the same normative assumptions but fewer/less extreme
descriptive idealisations, and see whether the conclusion of interest emerges. Such a
model will typically be harder to build, and harder to use—idealisations, remember,
simplify analysis. But suppose that it is done, and that the conclusion re-emerges: this
lends some support to the claim that it has normative force. We could build up this
support inductively by considering successively less idealised models. This is a relatively
simple sounding strategy, but I am pessimistic about its success: in science de-idealisation
is often very difficult or impossible.14
More often we will have to put up with our idealisations. Scientific models work
well, often because of idealisations, but their use involves an acknowledgement of their
limitations and fallibility. Their value is in allowing the modeller to capture the main
features of a system’s behaviour, driven by the most important underlying factors. In
complex systems this is remarkable, but it comes at a cost. Sometimes that cost is
precision: the model captures a general pattern, but cannot make precise predictions.
Sometimes, it is generality: the model works well in this particular case, but not outside of
it. Scientists determine these restrictions by considering the nature of their idealisations.
Philosophers, too, ought to do so. This may result in regarding results as normative
under certain conditions, or within a certain domain. The philosopher might conjecture
that the norm holds more widely, but no more. This is in contrast to current practice in
which a particular mathematical argument might be presented as establishing the norm
of Probabilism.
One option is to study the role of the descriptive idealisation mathematically, and thus
bolster the argument that the result is normative outside of the domain of the model. In
simple cases, this looks like varying the value of a numerical parameter: if the idealisation
is no friction, represented by k = 0, we might study the behaviour of the model for small
values of k. If our descriptive idealisation takes this form, this may be a useful strategy.
I expect this to be more difficult in philosophy, where our assumptions are rarely framed
as numerical parameters. How exactly to perform this sensitivity analysis will depend on
the case, but I will offer two examples to illustrate some basic concepts.
First consider the famous paper on the interpersonal comparability of individual wel-
14This process of de-idealisation was proposed by McMullin (1985) as a way of neutralising the chal-
lenge idealisations pose to realism in the philosophy of science. However, Morrison (2005) has argued
convincingly that this de-idealisation is often impossible in modern physics.
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fare by Sen (1970). He notes that ideal theory results assume comparability, which is
philosophically suspect, but that the opposing literature makes the equally extreme as-
sumption that individuals are not comparable at all. Sen instead studies different points
on the spectrum between full interpersonal comparability of welfare and incomparability,
in order to determine which desirable results continue to hold at each point.15 The genius
of this paper is in taking seriously the observation that we happily make some welfare
comparisons, by finding a way to construct a spectrum of partial comparability rather
than assuming full comparability.
Second, recall that Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that, when voters have three
or more options, there is no way to convert the preferences of individuals into a collec-
tive preference ranking while also meeting a set of criteria that are taken to represent
normative ideals for democracy (Arrow, 1951). Of particular interest in the subsequent
literature was the risk that the social ordering would contain cycles. In a well-known paper
Gehrlein (1983) demonstrated via simulations that the larger the population, the greater
the chance of cycles. This caused much concern that democracy might be irrational. In
tension with this were empirical results showing that cycles are in fact relatively rare
(Mackie, 2003). The explanation of this tension is that the formal result was an artefact.
Gehrlein made use of an “impartial culture” assumption, itself the conjunction of a nor-
mative idealisation (universal domain - a norm of democracy that we set no restrictions
on which personal preferences are allowed) and a descriptive idealisation (equiprobability
- that each of these preferences is equally likely in a population). Gehrlein’s increasing
likelihood of cycles is a knife edge result: sensitive to the precise equiprobability of pref-
erences. Christian List proved that “given suitable systematic, however slight, deviations
from an impartial culture, the probability that there will be a cycle under pairwise ma-
jority voting vanishes as the number of individuals increases” (List and Goodin, 2001,
A4). He concludes: “An impartial culture is a rather unstable limiting case.”
Careful analysis of the relation between idealisations is another fruitful strategy. The
“coherent extendibility” thesis provides a good example of this. The version I will consider
here concerns partial belief, and the interplay between transitivity and completeness.
Suppose incompleteness is rational, so that an agent might fail to compare propositions
A and C in terms of comparative confidence. But suppose that they judge that A is
more likely than B, and B more likely than C. Transitivity demands that they judge
A more likely than C. But, since we are permissive about incompleteness, we don’t
want this judgement. What this calls for is a revision of the norm of transitivity, and a
reinterpretation of the role of completeness. Failures of transitivity due to incompleteness
are no problem, we now say. But, should the agent’s gaps be filled in, the extension of
their attitude to a complete attitude ought to be coherent (see (Jeffrey, 1992, 85), (Joyce,
1998, 103)). An agent whose current, incomplete, belief state commits them to violating
transitivity if they complete their attitude is at fault, rationally speaking.
The preceding paragraph is a way of understanding the idealisations of transitivity
and completeness which feature in a standard Bayesian model. It is a “key”, in the sense
of Frigg and Nguyen: it tells us to read transitivity in this qualified way, and to regard
completeness as neither simply a descriptive idealisation nor as a norm itself. Rather,
it facilitates a focus on other idealisations: the normative ones. The model represents
not the agent’s actual beliefs, nor the normative requirements on those current beliefs,
but the normative requirements on a completion of those beliefs. So it can’t be read as
generating norms that are straightforwardly applicable to real agents. Special care must
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be taken with any differences between the model and reality that result directly from
this completion. Some aspects of the credal representation may be non-unique given the
coherent extendibility interpretation; for example, there may be different completions
compatible with the agent’s real comparative confidences, each of which would generate
different numerical credences. If so, we should not rely too closely on the precise values of
these credences. However, we can straightforwardly rely on aspects of the representation
which come directly from the agent’s actual comparative confidence, such as inequalities
between credences for propositions towards which they have an attitude. Due to these
limitations, if one is interested in situations where the incompleteness is thought to be
important, this model may be of limited use.
The emerging view is a cautious one. Certainly more cautious than current practice,
and significantly more qualified than one recent discussion of the success of normative
models. In a recent paper, Beck and Jahn (2021) propose normative models secure
their normative inferences simply by fitting the data, a set of independently justified
normative judgements. A model which does so identifies a pattern to these judgements,
which it then projects onto new cases. The role of normative models is thus to extend
normative justification from familiar to novel cases. For Beck and Jahn, there need not be
any normative assumptions involved in building a model: a black-box machine learning
model could be a successful normative model, so long as the data it is fitting is a set
of normative judgements. The modeller’s purposes play no role in their account and
normative idealisations, as I define them, are discussed only in a competing account that
Beck and Jahn ultimately reject.
While their account has some appealing features I think it is unsatisfactory for three
reasons. Beck and Jahn seem to take evidence that a model works in known cases—i.e.,
that it fits data—as reason to believe it will work in new circumstances. The first issue is
that they don’t offer a justification for this move. In science such inferences are justified
by a kind of inference to the best explanation about the model capturing a mechanism or
causal capacity which generated the pattern and which scientists expect to be stable. No
parallel argument is offered by Beck and Jahn (for discussion of a this kind of stability
and projection in normative modelling, see Roussos (ms)). Second, Beck and Jahn give
us no way to identify a domain in which a model will produce reliable inferences. On my
account, idealisations and purposes set the scope and, as I will discuss below, descriptive
idealisations limit a normative model’s scope. Third, while their account might tell us
when an inference is secure, but it doesn’t allow us to generate explanations. On my
account, normative idealisations are the normative inputs, which then naturally play a
role in explaining the derivative norms that emerge from the model. As Beck and Jahn
neglect purpose and idealisation, the resources I use for these purposes, I don’t see how
they could account for them.
6.2 Purpose, Scope, and Criticism
Scientific models are purpose-specific, with restricted domains of applicability. Does this
also apply if we choose to think of NFE as modelling? In a weak sense of purpose-
specificity, this might seem trivial. We are discussing agential models of rationality, built
to explore the rationality conditions on partial belief. That fills the basics of “purpose”—
it tells us what the model is a model of, and what it is trying to do. But does this purpose
also lead to modelling choices that restrict the model’s usefulness in answering some
questions, giving it limited scope? Are our models evaluated not on their truthfulness (the
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ultimate aim of our inquiry), but instead on their adequacy for purpose (the immediate
aim of model-based inquiry)? I argue yes. I will demonstrate two further ways in which
NFE models are purpose-specific. The first related to high-level purposes, and the second
relates to idealisations.
To begin, let’s consider the high-level purposes of epistemologists engaged in NFE. I
will name a few distinct projects that philosophers use models for, and doubtless there
are others. We might have some norms, like transitivity and monotonicity, and want to
see what they imply for the structure of partial belief. Or, the norms might be under
investigation: we test a candidate norm by seeing whether it generates counter-intuitive
consequences. We might test a set of norms, to see if they are consistent (a common
practice in social choice theory). Each of these aims will imply virtues that models
should have to facilitate them.
Consider again the idealisation of logical omniscience. Regardless of whether it is a
norm, the Bayesian models we have been discussing have a natural domain restriction:
they are no good for modelling cognitively limited agents reasoning in the face of logical
or mathematical uncertainty. I think it is open to Bayesians to say: this is a model of
empirical uncertainty, it is not intended to be used for other purposes. It comes with
a key which tells users to disregard claims which are about logical uncertainty. The
boundaries are going to be fuzzy, however, and so we should expect disagreements about
what counts as the legitimate domain of Bayesianism qua model of empirical uncertainty.
So, evaluating such models requires paying attention to these purposes. This gives us a
way of focusing on which truths the model is aiming at, and what degree of closeness to
the truth is required for those domains.
As you can now see, criticising models is a complex business. As models have re-
stricted domains, and specific purposes, the most natural way to critique a model is by
examining its performance of its purpose within its domain. Performing poorly on other
tasks, or in other domains, does not necessarily count against a model. Counterexamples
count against a model directly only when they are within its scope. It it therefore of first
importance to delineate these scopes, explicitly and upfront, when we model. Counterex-
amples from outside a model’s scope can count against it indirectly, when models are
being compared. If a second model performs better on the shared purpose and has wider
scope, then it will be favoured. But this is quite rare in science—models often cannot do
exactly the same things as one another. So we may have to get used to a landscape of
different models, each built for different purposes. Our understanding of the epistemic
domain is enriched by having multiple perspectives, even if they are limited and contrary,
and even if none is an obvious candidate for the one true theory of the epistemic.
This will be disappointing to many who seek a unified framework which delivers
universal laws. But to them I say: there is a rich literature in the philosophy of science
about the relation between models and theory, the development of laws, and strategies for
using multiple models to this end. This is an area ripe for further metaphilosophical work.
But for the time being, it clearly calls for changes to how we practice our philosophy. Let
me end by summarising three common modes of arguing which need to be treated with
care if we regard NFE as modelling.
 Property X appears in our best account of rational partial belief. Therefore, agents
are rationally required to have property X. (The “argument for probabilism from
representation theorems” employs this move—e.g., in Maher (1993), and see (Hájek,
2008; Konek, 2019) for discussion.)
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One we replace the term “account” with “model” it becomes clear we need to be
careful. In the scientific case, realist inferences from discovered properties of the
model to the target must be motivated with reference to their (in)dependence on
idealising assumptions. Similarly, in the normative case, not all properties in the
model are going to count as normative. Ignorance of a model’s key makes it very
difficult to cogently criticise. This leads to a methodological norm for modellers:
be clear about what you regard as an artefact, and what you intend to be imputed
to the target.
 Property X appears in your account. Property X is absurd, so your account is false.
(Glymour (1980) repeatedly deploys this move.)
As above, we now see that useful models may contain plainly false idealisations and
generate odd artefacts, which must not be used when generating claims about the
target. But modellers who analyse the interplay between idealisations and work
with clear keys have little to worry about.
 Your account doesn’t work in case Y. Y is a counterexample, so your account is
false. (Very common.)
Models have a domain of applicability, so each “counterexample” must be checked
against this domain. Objections irrelevant to the model’s intended purpose have
no bite. Instead, they motivate for a different model to be developed (perhaps to
handle just those cases, or to expand the scope). Working out the boundaries of
applicability for different philosophical models is a research area deserving of more
attention.
I presented a dilemma for epistemologists engaging in formal normative work: mod-
elling or bust. The “bust” horn of the dilemma itself offers a two possibilities, both
of which I regard as unattractive. Either NFE must rely exclusively on normative as-
sumptions when building its formal representations, or it must accept that its numerous
falsehoods undermine the project relative to its own goals. Better to regard NFE as mod-
elling. Once we do, we can identify room for improvement in our methodology—starting
with the discussion in this section. Finally, accepting that we are modelling in NFE need
not mean giving up on the final goal of true exceptionless generalisations. I mean to
remain neutral on whether our final endpoint will be a true and unified theory of the
epistemic, or a collection of domain-specific models. But whatever the goal and whatever
its chances of success, true exceptionless generalisations are unlikely to be generated by
any single modelling study. For those who seek theory, more methodological work is
required to develop tools to take us from our models towards that more unified theory of
the epistemic.
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Alan Hájek. Arguments For, or Against, Probabilism? The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 59(4):793–819, 2008.
R. I. G. Hughes. Models and Representation. Philosophy of Science, 64:S325–S336, 1997.
Richard Jeffrey. Probability and the art of judgment. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1992.
James M. Joyce. A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 65:
575–603, 1998.
24
Rosanna Keefe. Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New
York, 2000.
Jason Konek. Comparative Probabilities. In Richard Pettigrew and Jonathan Weis-
berg, editors, The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology, pages 267–348. PhilPapers
Foundation, 2019.
Larry Laudan. The Epistemic, the Cognitive, and the Social. In Peter Machamer and
Gereon Wolters, editors, Science, values, and objectivity, pages 14–23. University of
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2004.
Hannes Leitgeb. Scientific philosophy, mathematical philosophy, and all that. Metaphi-
losophy, 44(3):267–75, 2013.
E Lemmon and G Henderson. Is there only one correct system of model logic? Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, 33:23–56, 1959.
Christian List and Robert E. Goodin. Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet
Jury Theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy, 9(3):277–306, September 2001.
Gerry Mackie. Democracy Defended. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Patrick T. Maher. Betting on Theories. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Ernan McMullin. Galilean idealization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Part A, 16(3):247–273, September 1985. Publisher: Pergamon.
Christopher J. G. Meacham. Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionaliza-
tion. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 3, 2016.
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